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Legislative decision-making in the European Union is increasingly shifting toward informal secluded
arenas, to allow for the early adoption of laws. Edoardo Bressanelli, Christel Koop and Christine
Reh assess the implications of this trend for the behaviour of political parties in the European
Parliament. They ﬁnd that informalisation has strengthened the cohesion of the three centrist
groups (EPP, S&D and ALDE), which have become more eﬀective in delivering their members’
votes and in limiting defections. However, the authors argue that this increase in cohesion should
not be taken as unconditionally good news for EU democracy.
Over the last decades, the European Parliament has been empowered by successive rounds of EU
Treaty reform: it has gained a prominent role in the appointment of the European Commission
(President), a shared budgetary authority, and the power to veto the EU’s trade agreements. Most
importantly, the Parliament has been turned into a genuine co-legislator under the decision
procedure.
Indeed, the EU has come to resemble a bicameral system of two equally powerful chambers, with
Europe’s citizens represented in the Parliament and the member states represented in the Council.
At the same time, codecision — or the ‘ordinary legislative procedure’, as rebranded by the Lisbon
Treaty — has changed signiﬁcantly since its introduction in 1993. In particular, what used to be a
lengthy legislative process—with laws regularly concluded at second reading, and frequently
requiring conciliation at third reading — has been transformed into a process where the Parliament
and the Council routinely adopt laws ‘early’ at ﬁrst reading. The ﬁgure below shows that third
readings are nearly extinct today, and the number of second readings is much reduced.
Figure 1: Towards the end of third reading conclusions?
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Source: Data from the authors’ on-going research on informal legislative politics in the
European Union. Further information is available here.
This transformation, which ran in parallel to the Parliament’s empowerment, happened for two reasons. First, the
1999 Amsterdam Treaty made it formally possible to adopt a law at ﬁrst reading under codecision. Such early
adoption hinges upon the ‘rubberstamping’ of a pre-agreed compromise at ﬁrst reading in both Parliament and
Council.
Second, to capitalise on the possibility of early conclusion, the co-legislators and the Commission developed an
informal system of tripartite meetings, known as ‘trilogues’, in which the compromises are negotiated. The informal
politics of codecision proved highly successful: ﬁrst reading agreements soared from 29 per cent in the Fifth
Parliament (1999-2004) to 85 per cent in the Seventh (2009-14); currently, almost all legislation adopted by the EU
is pre-negotiated in trilogue. The ﬁgure below provides evidence for this trend; it contrasts the number of co-
decision ﬁles pre-agreed informally and concluded early (early agreements) with the number of ﬁles following the
‘formal route’ (non early agreements).
Figure 2: The development of early agreements over time
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Source: Data from our on-going research on informal legislative politics in the European
Union. Further information is available here.
Given the scale of this trend and the concomitant transformation of the EU’s inter-institutional bargaining, we were
curious about the impact of informalisation on political parties: on their organisation of work in the European
Parliament, on their legislative behaviour and, in particular, on their cohesion (that is, their ability to contain dissent
and hold the line in a vote).
We argued that informalisation should change parties’ voting behaviour: if an informal compromise — agreed
between Parliament and Council, perhaps after several rounds of trilogues — is not approved by the plenary at ﬁrst
reading, the law cannot be adopted early. And such failure is costly for parties: it undermines their credibility as
reliable partners, jeopardises future opportunities for inﬂuence in trilogues, and ‘sinks’ resources invested in the
search for compromise. Consequently, in ‘high stakes’ votes on early agreements, parties should invest particularly
in disciplining and/or coordinating their members—to strengthen their voting unity and, thus, to make sure that the
Parliament keeps its commitment vis-à-vis the Council.
Analysing roll-call votes on all concluded codecision ﬁles from 1999 to 2011, we found strong evidence that
informalisation does aﬀect parties’ voting behaviour. Yet, it does not aﬀect all parties equally. Most importantly, our
research suggests that only the three centrist groups are aﬀected by early agreements and modify their behaviour
accordingly. The European People’s Party (EPP), the Socialists and Democrats (S&D) and the Alliance of Liberals
and Democrats for Europe (ALDE) are signiﬁcantly more cohesive when voting on a compromise text, while
cohesion in the smaller political groups does not change or, in the case of the Eurosceptics, is actually lower.
We argue that these results are best explained by the particularly high costs of failing early agreements for centrist
parties. These parties always have domestic ‘counterparts’ in the Council; either the centre-right or the centre-left (if
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not both) are part of every winning coalition; and the liberals are often part of ‘super grand’ alliances behind a law.
These groups and their members have a lot to lose from not delivering at ﬁrst reading—reputation, inﬂuence,
reciprocity; they should, therefore, invest particularly heavily in discipline through sanctions and/or coordination
when their members vote on early agreements. At the same time, individual legislators have stronger incentives to
toe the line if their national party has been supportive of the compromise in the Council.
Our ﬁndings not only shed light on the actual functioning of the ordinary legislative procedure, and on the impact of
informalisation on political parties; they also raise broader normative questions. Where legislation has been pre-
agreed informally in secluded trilogues between the Parliament and the Council, the centrist groups are particularly
cohesive in plenary. In national democratic politics, cohesion is taken as an indicator of political parties’ ‘good
health’: only cohesive parties can deliver the votes to keep their (electoral) promises. In EU decision-making, the
routine pre-agreement of legislation between cohesive super-majorities of centrists within and across the EU’s
institutions may, indeed, be highly eﬃcient.
Yet, this trend questions whether the introduction of codecision has really led to the expected boost for public
deliberation and inclusiveness. Instead, our ﬁndings signal a growing ‘cartelisation’, with the centrist parties taking
advantage of the new informal politics to increase both inﬂuence over policies and control over their members.
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